University at Albany, State University of New York

Scholars Archive
History Faculty Scholarship

History

4-2013

A Different Lens
Ryan Irwin
University at Albany, State University of New York, rirwin@albany.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.library.albany.edu/history_fac_scholar
Part of the History Commons

Recommended Citation
Irwin, Ryan, "A Different Lens" (2013). History Faculty Scholarship. 10.
https://scholarsarchive.library.albany.edu/history_fac_scholar/10

This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the History at Scholars Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in History Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholars Archive. For
more information, please contact scholarsarchive@albany.edu.

A Roundtable Discussion on
Ryan M. Irwin's
Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking
of the Liberal World Order
James H. Meriwether, Eric J. Morgan, Philip Muehlenbeck, Leslie Hadfield, Kate Burlingham,
and Ryan M. Irwin

Introduction

fames H. Meriwether
he wind of change is blowing through this continent,
and whether we like it or not, this ~rowth of national
consciousness is a political fact,' declared British
prime minister Harold Macmillan before South Africa's
Parliament on an early February morning in 1960. "We must
all accept it as a fact, and our national policies must take
account of it." Macmillan, speaking to the decolonization
sweeping through Africa in this oft-quoted passage,
counseled his listeners that all "must come to terms" with
this reality.
As he continued talking that day, Macmillan framed
the "wind of change" in the broader Cold War context of
the "struggle for the minds of men." Bringing together,
as did many at the time, two of the great forces of the
mid-twentieth century, he voiced his belief that nothing
less than "our way of life" was at stake. His listeners
undoubtedly agreed with that sentiment. The ensuing
response by the South African government to those seeking
change, however, most assuredly was not what Macmillan
had in mind when he sat back down that morning. Just
weeks later sixty-nine South African protestors lay dead
at Sharpeville, the African National Congress and PanAfricanist Congress were banned, and black South African
leaders such as Nelson Mandela were on the run.
Over the next decade the situation in South Africa
became a matter of international attention-from the
capitals of newly independent African states, to the
corridors of power in Washington D.C., to the halls of the
United Nations. This international story plays out in new
and interesting ways on the pages of Ryan Irwin's book,
Gordian Knot. lrwin makes a case for Africa-and in this
instance the international interaction with apartheid South
Africa-being important to understanding the evolution
of post-Worfd War II international institutions and
unfolding world history. The Cold War, colonialism and
decolonization, and issues of race were central to the global
system in this era, and all these merged in Africa.
Historians and other scholars are devoting more
attention to just how these and other forces came together
and what that conjunction of forces meant. The roundtable
that follows is another step in the historical consideration of
the African continent, and it shows how such interest orens
more avenues for our understanding of the world o the
twentieth century. In the pages of these thoughtful reviews,
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one sees what a few years ago might have been hard to pull
together: a wealth of talented scholars wrestling with the
United States and Africa in an international context. They
agree that there is much to be gained by reading Irwin's
work even as they do not all agree on his interpretations.
Those differences are themselves a reminder of how much
there still is waiting to be explored.
A Lost Struggle, a Lost World

Eric f. Morgan
s I am finalizing this roundtable review of Ryan
Irwin's outstanding and groundbreaking debut
book, Gordian Knot, I am also preparing to depart
for South Africa, where I will be leading a travel course of
fifteen students to Cape Town for sixteen days. My proposal
for this course was so popular that, unfortunate1y, I had
to turn away many students. I was surprised-but also
delighted-with the positive response to South Africa as a
potential destination of interest, particularly given several
other attractive options. Yet my courses on the history of
South Africa routinely garner waitlists. For some reason
South Africa has always nad a strong appeal for my students
here in the snowy Packerland of nortneastern Wisconsin.
They are fascinated by it even now, nearly twenty years after
Nelson Mandela's inauguration as the nation's first black
president in 1994. Ryan Irwin is right that South Africa was
and still is an enigma: its complicated past and refusal to
submit to international norms fascinates us, and its history
is so strikingly similar to that of the United States that we
cannot help but be drawn to it.
Gordian Knot adeptly situates South Africa and the
complex issue of apartheid within the larger global
development of decolonization in the 1960s and offers
readers two major arguments about the era. First, Irwin
postulates that the postwar independence of various
African states was one of the most significant "ruptures"
of the twentieth century. What did nation, progress,
development, and even race mean in this new epoch
following the breakdown of the old order of the world?
Second, he argues that the United States' Cold War foreign
policy of containment changed rapidly during the 1960s,
and by the end of the decade, the nation-which had
once been a champion of decolonization-was now an
empire despised by much of the newly decolonized world.
Apartheid was not the paramount issue of the 1960s, yet
it created a divisive arena that brought a variety of actors
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from nations and governments large and small from across
reaching ramifications for the principle of self-government
the globe into a debate over what the world should look
and eventually lead to the end goal of majority rule in
like.
South Africa.
To illustrate his two major contentions, Irwin moves
In a close ruling, the ICJ decided that it had no legal
chronologically through several intriguing case studies
right to make a decision. That finding "shattered the idea
that provide insights into the changing world of the
that the Court would act as an agent of transitional justice"
(123). Humanitarian interests were extralegal in this case,
1960s and the place of South Africa and apartheid in that
dynamic global landscape. His initial chapter explores
the court ruled. The ICJ judges rationalized that the battle
South Africa's development as a "citadel of whiteness" and
should proceed in the political rather than the legal arena.
describes the rise of black African nationalism, articulated
In Irwin's eyes, the ICJ decision was a watershed
by colorful leaders such as Anton Lembede and Robert
moment. The ICJ had been the ultimate legal arbiter of the
Sobukwe, which challenged the status quo of white rule.
values of the world community and thus represented the
The Sharpeville Massacre of 1960, in which sixty-nine black
ideal of the liberal world order. As he notes, "the outcome
protesters were shot and killed by police following a mass
of the ICJ case reflected and reinforced" the trends of the
civil disobedience campaign against the
1960s and "became a powerful symbol,
nation's restrictive pass laws, changed
dramatizing the limitations of change in
South Africa's trajectory and brought the
the decolonized world and foreshadowing
What emerges from Irwin's
nation and apartheid into international
future directions in the struggle against
text is a gripping story.
consciousness.
apartheid in southern Africa" (105).
The various international
The following chapter develops
As a result of the ICJ's decision, Irwin
institutions created at the
the competing ideologies of African
argues, the African Group's strategy
end of the Second World
nationalists and the ruling National Party,
fractured. The United States subsequently
War-most specifically the
as each side attempted to define the debate
moved closer to the South African
UN and its principal judicial
over apartheid in its own terms after
government as a supporter of apartheid
body-materialize in Irwin's
Sharpeville. A chapter on U.S. foreign
in its foreign policy, particularly during
narrative as the critical arena
policy, concentrating on the thougnts
the Nixon administration. For Irwin, the
for the confrontation of
and actions of G. Mennen Williams, the
failure of the United Nations and its court
apartheid, even though they
assistant secretary of state for African
to confront apartheid successfully signaled
were ultimately ineffective.
Affairs, moves the story to the United States.
the end of Woodrow Wilson's vision of
The book's final section examines the 1966
liberal internationalism. The African
International Court of Justice (ICJ) case
National Congress solidified its position
involving South Africa's occupation of South West Africa
by the end of the 1960s as the legitimate organization of the
(modern Namibia) and then explores the United Nations'
liberation struggle (while in exile and largely removed from
the South African people). The National Party achieved a
African Group and the South African government's efforts
to capitalize on the various developments of the 1960s.
monolithic status of its own and continued to consolidate
its rule with scant internal opposition. The nation-state, the
What emerges from Irwin's text is a gripping story.
The various international institutions created at the end of
bane of the world and the cause of tumultuous conflict and
the Second World War-most specifically the UN and its
suffering for most of the twentieth century, still reigned
principal judicial body-materialize in Irwin's narrative
supreme in the international order. Colonialism remained
as the critical arena for the confrontation of apartheid,
alive and well after the rousing victories of African peoples
even though they were ultimately ineffective. As the
in the 1950s and early 1960s over their oppressors. The
world, Irwin concludes, turned postmodern, and today we
leaders of the South African liberation movements were
sent to prison or forced into exile in the early 1960s, the
are still dealing with the consequences of the fragmenting
focus of the antiapartheid campaign moved from internal
of the liberal world order.
struggle to external sanctions (apart from the misguided
Gordian Knot has few flaws. It draws on impressive and
exhaustive research from archives across three continents,
and remarkably unsuccessful attempts at armed struggle
through Umkhonto we Sizwe and Poqo). The United Front,
including the little-used papers of the African National
formed in London in 1960 as a collaboration between
Congress. The writing is generally crisp and the stories
compelling, though occasionally the author employs too
various liberation organizations in both South Africa and
the occupied South West Africa, pushed for sanctions at the
much jargon. I also wish that Irwin had spent slightly
international level. The African Group, a collective of African
more time in his initial chapters developing his thoughts
states within the UN itself, took up the mantle of sanctions
on what the liberal international order actually was meant
and won a critical victory when a formal declaration
to be in the context of the postcolonial era. Additionally,
if the ICJ had ruled against South Africa's occupation of
denouncing apartheid passed the General Assembly in
1962. The following year, the Security Council passed a
South West Africa (a single vote would have changed the
ruling), would the decision have then reflected the triumph
similar declaration-supported by U.S. Ambassador Adlai
Stevenson in the strongest condemnation yet by a Western
of liberal internationalism? Consequently, would apartheid
power-that included an arms embargo against South
have ended any sooner than it did? Would Nelson Mandela
Africa, but not the stiff economic sanctions that the African
and other political prisoners have been released from
Robben Island, and would a multiracial democracy have
Group had wished for. A victory to be certain, although, as
Irwin sees it, a Pyrrhic one.
been established at the end of the 1960s?
At the heart of Irwin's story is the ICJ case on the
Irwin also slightly underemphasizes the role of citizen
activists in the 1960s. He argues that it was not until the
South West Africa Mandate. The African Group's litigation
azainst South Africa was an attempt to undo the Mandate
1980s that the global antiapartheid movement truly
that entrusted South West Africa to South Africa as part of
coalesced and began to have an influence on policymakers,
corporations, and other powerful entities tnroughout the
the peace process following the end of the First World War.
As Irwin notes, however, this territory was a Mandate of
world. Perhaps the antiapartheid struggle beyond the
the League of Nations and not the UN. The South African
confines of tne UN actually legitimated the liberal world
order, as the people themselves-in the United States,
government rationalized that it was therefore no longer
a territory of the international community. The African
Great Britain, Sweden, New Zealand, and scores of nations
across the world-made the confrontation of apartheid a
Group sought to prove that South Africa's occupation
was illegitimate. A decision in their favor would have farpriority for the world community outside of traditional
PASSPORT A pri/201 3
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structures of governance, even when the UN and various
governments would not do so.
Ultimately, Gordian Knot is an exemplary model of what
innovative thinking, writing, and research can produce. It
is an erudite and important international history that melds
intellectual history, diplomacy, and a vast global tapestry
of ideas, personalities, and struggle, weaving together a
compelling story that situates both South Africa and the
United States in the postcolonial world of the 1960s. That
world offered much potential and promise at the decade's
outset but fell far short of fulfilling the hopes of those
who wanted a global order based on equality and selfdetermination for all peoples.

War. By the late 1960s, however, the combination of a
number of factors-preoccufation with the Vietnam War;
the weakening of the civi rights coalition within the
United States; a growing realization that the Cold War
would not be won or lost in sub-Saharan Africa; and a
Nixon administration less sensitive to the immoral nature
of racial discrimination-shifted U.S. policy. Not only did
the United States begin to support the legitimacy of South
African apartheid, it embarked on the "containment of
Third World political campaigns" (8).
The government of South Africa began to feel vulnerable
at this time not only because of the upswing in the political
influence of African nationalism, but also because of
changes in the views of the United States, the United
Review of Ryan M. Irwin, Gordian Knot: Apartheid and
Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, all of which began to assert
the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order
more pressure on Pretoria to abandon its apartheid policies.
Irwin should be commended for writing the most nuanced
Philip E. Muehlenbeck
account of this shift in history. South Africa adjusted to the
changing environment by spending significant time and
he late 1950s/early 1960s were an important time in
money on lobbying and public relations efforts designed to
world history. A wave of African incfependence saw
portray itself as steadfastly loyal to the West, fiercely antitwenty-four newly independent states admitted into
communist, and a citadel of capitalism-while painting the
the United Nations between 1960 and 1963. By 1964, the
nationalists of sub-Saharan Africa as unpredictable, with
number of nation states in that international body had more
loyalties for sale to the highest bidder in the Cold War, and
than doubled, and the percentage of member states from
as politically and economically unstable.
Africa and Asia had increased from roughly 24 percent
After detailing the changes in U.S. politics that impacted
to 52 percent. These changing demographics shifted the
American policies toward apartheid, Irwin roints to the
agenda of the UN toward the issues that
1966 International Court o Justice (ICJ)
African and Asian states cared most about:
case against South Africa's occupation of
In the late 1950s and early
South West Africa (modern day Namibia)
decolonization and racism. Ryan Irwin's
1960s African states were not
Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of
as a turning point in the African Group's
inconsequential players on
the Liberal World Order is a masterful study
fight against South African apartheid. He
the world stage. Riding high
of how policymakers in the United States,
notes that South African officials feared
on the winds of change tnat
South Africa, and newly independent subthat a ruling against them in the ICJ
swept away colonialism from
Saharan Africa responded to this new
would lead to severe sanctions or even
the continent (aside from the
environment in the international system.
an armed invasion by the international
notable exceptions in southern
Irwin rightly pinpoints the early 1960s
community, perhaps to evict them from
Africa), African leaders had
as the high point of African nationalist
South West Africa or to try to overturn
more political power in the
power. In the late 1950s and early 1960s
the apartheid system within their own
early 1960s than at any other
African states were not inconsequential
borders. (In fact, some of them had
point in modern history.
feared such an invasion at least since the
players on the world stage. Riding high
on the winds of change that swept away
Bay of Pigs. 1) However, the ICJ ruled in
Pretoria's favor, and the African Group
colonialism from the continent (aside
from the notable exceptions in southern
was forced to shift its strategy from
Africa), African leaders had more political
pursuing economic sanctions in the
power in the early 1960s than at any other point in modern
United Nations and legal action through the ICJ against
history. Irwin refers to African independence as "one of
apartheid to a more broadly based propaganda effort
the twentieth century's seminal ruptures" that augured
for global human rights. Here Irwin makes a persuasive
in an era in which the newly independent African states,
argument that this change altered the antiapartheid
working together through a united African Group at the
movement; it shifted from being rooted in opposition to
UN, challenged previously established views about the
racial discrimination and the sovereignty of states in the
"nature of territoriality, race, and economic progress" (9).
postcolonial system to being focused more on the universal
Opposition to apartheid in South Africa became the focus
human rights of the individual.
Gordian Knot is a well-written and well-organized
of the African Group's efforts at the UN and the "center of a
book built on the foundation of an impressive collection
larger conversation about the Cold War and decolonization
in the postcolonial decade" (40).
of archival research spanning three continents (Irwin uses
In response to such initiatives from the African Group,
the underutilized records of the United Nations and a wide
array of South African sources to best effect). Each theme
U.S. policymakers faced a difficult juggling act to figure out
how to manage decolonization and respond to international
of the book is vividly framed with effective short vignettes
racism as embodied by apartheid without jeopardizing
at the beginning of every chapter. Irwin's scholarship
their country's economic and military interests in the
is an intellectual tour de force that forces historians to
Cold War. Washington, in a sense, became trapped in the
contemplate new methodological and analytical questions.
middle and was forced to serve as a referee between the
Yet Irwin's arguments often outrun his evidence,
African Group and the South African government within
leading to exaggerated claims throughout the book. For
the UN. According to Irwin, the United States responded
example, early on he contends that "the fight against
to this dilemma in two distinct phases. From 1960 to 1965
apartheid gave form to the political project known as the
Third World" (5). But the formation of the third world
Washington sided more heavily with the African Group
in confronting South African apartheid. In doing so U.S.
owed more to opposition to the Cold War and European
officials were responding to the American civil rights
colonialism than opposition to apartheid, and the third
world would have been little different had apartheid never
movement, but they were also trying to draw the newly
independent African states to the West's side in the Cold
existed.
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Secondly, Irwin overstates how important an issue
South African apartheid was for African states. While firstgeneration African leaders certainly opposed apartheid, it
was not likely the issue they cared about most, as Irwin
implies. A review of memoranda of conversations between
U.S. and African officials in the late 1950s and early 1960s
would show that African leaders sought to discuss the
situations in the Congo, Angola, and Algeria with their
American counterparts more often than they did South
African apartheid. The issue that the majority of them
were most concerned about was the economic development
of their own nations. (Tanzania's Julius Nyerere was a
notable exception; for him, self-determination in southern
Africa seemed more important than economic aid for his
own state.) A litmus test for determining how important
the issue of apartheid was for African nationalists is the
side they took in the Cold War; few joined the Soviet camp
despite Soviet opposition to, and U.S. tacit support for,
apartheid South Africa.
Irwin also tends to give too much credit for U.S. African
policy to Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G.
Mennen Williams. As I have argued elsewhere, African
policy in the Kennedy administration, without a doubt,
originated in the White House. 2 In countless oral history
interviews American officials attribute the change in U.S.
policy towards Africa to the president himself. Kennedy
called country desk officers at the State Department to ask
specific questions about minute details on issues affecting
African nations. He asked his staff to compile reports on
Africa for him and then he personally reviewed them.
He circumvented the State Department and had direct
correspondence with a number of his ambassadors to
Africa. No other U.S. president has had as much personal
involvement in African affairs. Kennedy not only met with
more African heads of state than any other U.S. president,
he also, I am sure, met with more ambassadors from African
countries than any other occupant of the White House.
Moreover, let us not forget that Kennedy took an
interest in Africa and became a public supporter of African
nationalism before virtually any other U.S. politician,
as is evidenced by his speech on Algeria in 1957. He also
became the chairman of the Senate's Foreign Relations
African Subcommittee, through which he met with
numerous African politicians even before ascending to
the presidency. 3 Williams was only in a position to make
changes to U.S. African policy because Kennedy selected
him for the assistant secretary position and empowered
him to do so (tellingly, JFK appointed Williams to that
position even before naming a secretary: of state). Finally,
Kennedy fully supported Williams after his "Africa for the
Africans" comments (which Irwin does not discuss), when
there was significant pressure (particularly from South
Africans and Rhodesians) on him to replace Williams at the
State Department. Williams obviously played an important
role in setting the U.S. position on apartheid in the early
1960s, but he was not as much of a maverick or an originator
of policy as Irwin's account would suggest.
Irwin's central thesis-that African independence and
the African Group's fight against apartheid challenged
U.S. power and controi over international organizations
like the United Nations, the World Bank, and the IMF
more than any other variable and "not only laid the seeds
of detente" but also "marked the unmaking of America's
liberal world order"-is a far-reaching and not fully
persuasive claim (12). It seems to this reviewer that other
factors such as globalization, the Sino-Soviet split, U.S.
economic stagnation, and the rise of emerging powers like
China, India, Brazil, and Japan were likely more important.
Nonetheless, Gordian Knot is an impressive scholarly
achievement in international history and deserves a wide
audience.
PASSPORT Apri/2013

Notes:
1. See Philip E. Muehlenbeck, Betting on the Africans: John F. Kennedy's Courting of African Nationalist Leaders (New York, 2012), 185.
2. H-Diplo Roundtable Review of Philip E. Muehlenbeck, Betting

on the Africans: John F. Kennedy's Courting of African Nationalist
Leaders. Volume XIV, No. 3 (October 1, 2012).
3. For more on Kennedy's policies towards Africa see Muehlenbeck, Betting on the Africans.

African States and the Complexities of International
Anti-apartheid Movements

Leslie Hadfield
n Gordian Knot, Ryan M. Irwin opens an important
window into the international politics of the 1960s
and casts new light on the way tne apartheid state and
anti-apartheid forces fit into the international arena. The
decade was a crucial period in African and South African
history. Decolonization swept across much of the continent,
and after the Sharpeville massacre South Africa entered
a new era. The state cracked down on opposition, beefed
up its security establishment, and turned increasingly to
extra-legal means to quell resistance, forcing liberation
movements underground and into exile. The African
National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress
(PAC) both established armed organizations. South
Africans and the international community were forced to
choose sides.
Irwin provides us with a much-needed examination of
the international side of the story that gives us a sense for the
complex, non-linear history of apartheid and anti-apartheid
movements. His in-depth analysis of the decisions and
directions different actors took at different times in the 1960s
helps explain some of the paradoxical shifts of the decade.
He also demonstrates how international and domestic
politics in South Africa and the United States converged
at a critical juncture, while at the same time extending his
analysis beyond just the engagement of the United States
and the West. Yet, while ne admirably brings out the
important role of African forces in international politics,
his portrayal of African nations and events raises further
questions about the influence of African politics and actors.
Irwin's focus on different moments in the 1960s is a
testament to the value of taking a snapshot in time. Not
only does he paint vivid pictures of particular incidents
(e.g., the assassination of Hendrik Verwoerd or G. Mennen
Williams getting hit in the jaw in Lusaka), he also examines
the debates, events, and maneuvers that exrlain political
shifts of the decade, when the outcome o the struggle
against apartheid was unclear. As Irwin writes, this indepth analysis shows that South Africa's road to liberation
was not inevitable, but "a political contest that ebbed and
flowed in various directions as different doors opened and
closed on international and domestic stages" (186).
Irwin considers two of these shifts tnat are particularly
valuable to understanding paradoxical international
politics of the 1960s. First is the change in American policy
towards South Africa from confrontation to "constructive
reinvolvement" or support. His detailing of the work
of people committed to ending racism abroad through
international liberalism in the early 1960s shows that the
possibility of concrete U.S. opposition did emerge in an
otherwise long narrative of U.S. government support for
the apartheid state. He also explains how the pendulum
swung in the opposite direction for economic and domestic
political reasons, despite the U.S. civil rights movement.
Second, Irwin examines the way African nations moved from
championing the anti-apartheid cause in the UN to offering
merely support to South African liberation movements.
At the same time, the South African government began
"looking outward" to build relationships with neighboring
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states. Looking at these two developments side by side helps
debate about apartheid-the United States or the African
us understand why leaders of indeRendent African nations
Group?
I came to the conclusion that Irwin was not contradicting
would talk and work with the apartheid government in the
late 1960s.
himself, but that the answer is both shaped global politics in
different ways. And the rest of Irwin's book demonstrates
The greatest contribution Irwin makes, however, is
how it was a series of actions and reactions on the part of a
the way he links the apartheid debate to African politics
in the post-colonial international arena. His analysis of
number of players that determined the terms of debate and
the political possibilities. Yes, African decolonization and
the role the so-called third world played in antiapartheid
movements fills a gap in the history of apartheid and antiAfrican initiatives in the UN changed the intellectual terrain
apartheid movements. At the core of his argument is the
and Rushed others to address apartheid, but superpowers
like the United States had the political power (e.g., seats
observation that newly independent African nations used
on the Security Council) and economic interests to direct
their sheer numbers to wield enough influence in the UN
to bring the apartheid issue to the fore. Working largely
outcomes. Perhaps a cleaner chronology and organization
through the UN African Group in the early 1960s, they
of the chapters and narratives of the first part of the book
would have cleared up this seeming contradiction. Irwin
were able to push members of the Security Council to
could also have addressed this tension more explicitly.
debate apartheid and take a stand on related issues. Irwin
adeptly shows how members of the African Group defined
Irwin could also have given blackAfricans more of a face.
decolonization as resulting in racial equality, territorial
Except for a few familiar names (such as Kwame Nkrumah,
Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda, and the ANC's Oliver Tambo),
autonomy, and economic development. They expected the
UN to act in support of their vision, and their campaign
most Africans appear as vague characters. We get only brief
prompted UN members to reconsider the
appearances by heads of states and an
unnamed Nigerian ambassador (58). By
organization's purposes and reposition
African interactions with the
contrast, Irwin examines American and
themselves witnin it.
South African state and antiSouth African diplomats quite closely. He
Because Irwin gives African actors at
apartheid movements are an
does offer insigntful analysis of African
the UN due attention, he helps establish a
important element of the history
well-rounded view of international anticontinental politics, especially in relation
of South African liberation and
apartheid activities and politics. African
to the International Court of Justice
merit in-depth exploration.
interactions with the South African
case over South West Africa, the Kitwe
The interests of activists,
state and anti-apartheid movements
conference, and the way that liberation
archivists, and writers have
are an important element of the history
movements interacted with new African
resulted in a skewed focus on
of South African liberation and merit
states throughout the 1960s. However,
the antiapartheid activities of
in-depth exRloration. The interests of
questions about the influence of domestic
American and British activists.
activists, archivists, and writers have
African national politics and the relations
between African states remain.
resulted in a skewed focus on the
I do not fault Irwin too much for
antiapartheid activities of American
and British activists. For example, the
this shortcoming. The book includes the
seven-part documentary Have You
politics of numerous African countries.
Conducting research for all of these actors in the same
Heard from Johannesburg (2006) devotes one entire erisode
to American activists while attempting to cover al other
way would have been a monumental task. Furthermore,
movements around the world with the rest. The South
the kind of rich sources Irwin drew upon for the United
African Democracy and Education Trust (SADET) Road to
States and South African side of the story may not exist in
some of the other cases. Yet Irwin shows us how insightful
Democracy series offers a more balanced view in its third
volume focused on international solidarity. 1 SADET's fifth
a close examination of the role of particular people can be
volume will focus on African solidarity, but it has yet to be
in the chapter featuring Williams. One wonders how much
more could be revealed if the same sort of research and
published. Gordian Knot thus provides an important analysis
analysis could be done for other actors. I also wondered
of the crucial role of African states and actors. Moreover,
Irwin's approach links South Africa to what was happening
what impact other major Cold War developments on the
on the rest of the continent and thus balances South Africa's
continent had on both U.S. and African positions and
relations. For example, considering the CIA's involvement
exceptionalism with its connections to continental Africa.
in Patrice Lumumba's capture and death, how did Williams
That said, I struggled with the tension in the book
between acknowledging the influence of African nations
perceive the Congo crisis? Did it impact his actions or the
in shaping the international debate over apartheid and its
dialogue at the UN? There is much work for others to do in
investigating the questions that Gordian Knot raises. Perhaps
trajectory on the one hand, and holding up the United States
as the major player on the international scene on the other.
the forthcoming SADET volume on African antiapartheid
movement solidarity will answer some of them. Those who
The emphasis on the significance of African decolonization
and African groups in the UN for international politics
tackle these guestions should be alert to the problems of
in the introduction led me to expect more of an African
juxtaposing tne entire diverse continent of Africa with a few
individual states.
focus throughout the book. Irwin does provide this focus
in some of his critical chapters, such as chapter 2, where
Irwin presents a more balanced portrayal of South
he demonstrates how African nationalists and Afrikaner
African actors-both the apartheid state and liberation
nationalists defined the debate in the UN from 1960 to 1964.
movements. Still, more attention to internal politics and
Yet he follows that chapter with one (titled "Africa for the
developments could have strengthened his analysis. For
Africans") focused entirely on G. Mennen Williams and
example, his explanation of the ANC's shift to focusing
U.S. foreign policy towards apartheid in the UN. These two
on building solidarity with non-state international groups
is incisive; but other factors could have been considered
chapters put forth seemingly contradictory arguments. In
in explaining ANC changes in the 1960s, such as internal
chapter 2, it is African and Afrikaner nationalists defining
tensions over the turn to violence (see recent debates
the debate and reshaping international politics, while in
chaRter 3, the United States is an "unquestioned hegemon
sparked by Scott Couper's book on Albert LuthulF) and the
by the early 1960s," shaping global politics and political
impact of state repression. South Africa also saw the growth
of above-ground antiapartheid activity in the late 1960s
possibilities. A similar contradiction is repeated in chapters
that was linked to international movements beyond formal
4 and 5. The contradiction left me questioning what Irwin
was really arguing. Who was shaping global politics and the
politics and the AN C. It would be useful to gauge the impact
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that student networks and religious organizations like the
World. Council of Churches (in which South Africans played
an active role) had on the ANC and international politics.
All. in all, ~owev.er, Gordian Kn~t accomplishes a great
deal. It IS an enhghtenmg book that will spark fruitful debates
and inspire research that will further our understanding of
the apartheid state, antiapartheid movements, and the postcolonial international world order.
Notes:
1. South African Democracy and Education Trust, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 3: International Solidarity (Pretoria
2008).
2. Scott Couper, Albert Luthuli: Bound by Faith (Durban, 2010).
I

Review of Ryan Irwin, Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the
Unmaking of the Liberal World Order

Kate Burlingham
frica's involvement in global politics during the
Cold War is usually described as peripheral at best.
. If Afric~n leaders are ~ncluded in Cold War history,
then presence IS usually fleetmg and hardly essential to the
narr~tive. O~e often has .to refer to mor~ topical monographs
f~r mt~gration of Afncan leaders mto global political
discussions and for thorough analysis of their motivations.
With impressive style and analytical skill, Ryan Irwin
has att~mpted to address this historiograrhical problem
by ad~mg .a much-needed c~apter to the historiography
?f Afn~a m the world. Usmg an . exhaustive array of
mt~rnatlonal sources and approachmg the topic from a
vanety of vantage points, Irwin's fascinating book, Gordian
Knot, offers new insight into how African decolonization
radically altered the global political climate and post-World
War II international institutions.
The 1960s was one of the most crucial twentieth-century
decades for the African continent. Yet the way African and
global leaders interacted with each other during the early
1960s ?iffered radically from the way they engaged each
other JUSt ten years later. Why? What occurred in such
a short timespan? Gordian Knot demonstrates that this
change was sfiaped by one battle in particular: the fight
to end South African apartheid. Apartheid was African
nationalists' "real-time foil"; it embraced "racial segregation
and colonial-style paternalism" at the very moment when
much of the world was moving away from colonialism (10,
5). The b~ttle to end aparth~id united. third world leaders
even as It ~hallenged then contention that modernity
and economic advancement could not be achieved in a
bifurcated racialist system.
The battle against apartheid also offered third world
leaders a way to define themselves outside the bipolarity
of the Cold War. They used the United Nations and other
pos.twar international institutions as platforms from
which to wage the battle. These institutions were created
after the Second World War out of a rejection of the
racism and imrerialism that defined the era of European
colonialism. When these same institutions failed to stop
and even bolstered the South African government, third
worl.d. leader.s had to rec.onsider the ways in which they
partiCipated m global sooety. Through his narrative, Irwin
demonstr~tes how the apartheid debate, often relegated
to the penphery of Cold War studies, in fact exemplifies
many of tne key debates of the day while foreshadowing
important discussions of the post-Cold War era.
Using South African apartheid as its focus, Gordian
Knot asks an essential question: "How did the rapid growth
of small, non-European nation-states at midcentury affect
the international community" (5)? Irwin's answer forms
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the two primary arguments of his book. On the one hand,
he seeks to expose the centrality of African decolonization
to the story of twentieth-century world history. Indeed, it
is through decolonization, we are told, that contemporary
actors discussed important issues related to "the nature
of territoriality, race, and economic progress" (9). Irwin's
sec<;mdary argul!len~ flows f~om the changes ushered in by
Afncan decoiomzatwn. Agamst the backdrop of a rapidly
evolving Africa, the United States strugg1ed to react.
According to Irwin, these reactions concerned more than
Africa; tney marked a moment in which "Washington's
approach toward the rest of the world-its stance towards
global governance-changed fundamentally" (11). As the
authors of many of the postwar global institutions, United
?tates o!ficials did not fully calculate how a change in
mternatlonal order, ushered in by decolonization, might
cha~lenge ~heir conception. of the global power structure.
Irwm beheves that Afncan decolonization and the
"?udden emergence of almost forty non-European states"
simultaneously confirmed "America's post-imperial vision
of the world" while offering "a direct threat to Washington's
continued hegemony" (12).
The United States, it turned out, could not control these
new states. At a moment when American leaders were
trying to ameliorate domestic race problems and fight a
war for the allegiance of the world's decolonizing peoples,
African leade~s put "guesti<?ns of race squa~ely at the center
of world affairs ... lexrosmg] the preJUdiCes that quietly
underpinned Americas liberal world order" (12). The
importance of this challenge, Irwin tells us, extends beyond
Washington and marks "the moment when small, non~urope~n states took ~orTal control of the agenda of the
mternational commumty (12). That changeover, in turn,
marked an important shift in the United States' interaction
with these international organizations, which would no
longer be the "bulwark of American global powers" (12). By
the end of the 1960s, the United States had decided to back
~way fr<?m the. UN, a~d that decision recast its once positive
mternatwnal Image mto the world's "New Empire" (13).
Global politics would never be the same.
Irwin divides his text into two parts that revolve around
a pivotal moment in the story, the 1966 International Court
of Justice (ICJ) rul~ng regarding South A.fr!ca's occupation
of. Southwest Afnca (present-day Namibia). At stake in
this case was not only South Africa's right to remain in
Sou.thwest Africa but also, according to Irwin, the faith of
Afncan leaders in so-called "postcolonial organizations"
such as the ICJ and the UN as well as their overall "faith
in the nation-state as an instrument of development and
freedom" (154).
Part I explores the lead-up to the ICJ crisis in three
expertly crafted chapters that cover the three venues in
wnich the debate over apartheid played out: South Africa,
the UN, and the United States. In the first chapter of this
section, Irwin sets up the antagonisms that defined South
African politics after the Second World War. As much of
the world was moving away from colonialism and racial
segregation, South Africa was moving towards it. We
learn, however, that rather than being a monolithic idea,
t~e. system of apartheid g~ew out of several competing
VISions. The vmces opposmg the developing apartheid
state were equally diverse. Yet, according to Irwin, what
set Afrikaner and African nationalists apart was not only
their views on race but, more important, now they saw the
world around them. Afrikaner nationalists framed their
worldview through domestic events. African nationalists,
on .the other hand, "fo~used o!-1- the symmetry between
their struggle and the fight agamst European exploitation
elsewhere" (38). This difference between Afrikaner and
African nationalists, Irwin explains, "foreshadowed the
fault lines of the global apartheid debate of the subsequent
decade" (39).
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Irwin brings the story to the UN in chapter 2 by
tracking the internationalization of the a2artheid debate
following the Sharpeville massacre, in which sixty-nine
protesters were gunned down by South African police.
Of particular interest in this chapter is Irwin's discussion
of fhe Afrikaner government's Shifting tactics in how it
packaged apartheid for the world. For lrwin, such tactics
reveal something more profound about the era: the "deep
fissures [that] separate the First World politicians from the
Third World ones" (44). The strength of Irwin's discussion
in this chapter lies in his observation that what ultimately
divided UN representatives in the debate over apartheid
was the role tney believed the international body should
have in the affairs of a sovereign state. Was the UN
meant to complement national power or was it meant to
be a "mechanism to reshape international norms"? The
profundity of this question is reinforced by its continued
relevance today.
Irwin's third chapter brings the apartheid debate to
South Africa's most strategically important ally, the United
States. While acknowledging that the United States "did
not have a direct stake in the apartheid debate," Irwin
stresses that its international power did nonetheless shape
"what was politically possible in these years" (73). Perhaps
the most significant nistoriographical contribution of tnis
chapter is Irwin's detailed analysis of the important role of
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen
Williams in crafting U.S. relations with Africa. Williams,
we learn, fundamentally "shaped how American global
power interacted with postcolonial questions ... [providing]
a consistent counterweight to those policymakers apathetic
about Third World political demands" (75).
Having outlined the major players involved, Irwin
begins Part II of his book with tne ICJ case on which his
entire story pivots. In his strongest chapter, he lays out
the important questions that the ICJ and South African
apartheid posed for the world, questions that would turn
out to have enormous significance for the future. At stake
for so-called third world nationalists was their belief in the
idea "that history was moving in a linear fashion toward a
political order based on territorial liberation, racial equality,
and economic development"(117). The applicants filing the
case against South Africa asked the court to look beyond
Southwest Africa and rule on the much larger question of
whether "there was a single moral system for the world."
And if there was, "did the 'international community' truly
have boundless supervisory powers over nation-states in
the world-system" (117)?
A ruling in favor of third world nationalists would have
validated an "emerging 'postcolonial' vision of power based
on universal racial equality" (118). Most observing nations,
and the United States in particular, began to think about
how they would react to what was seen as the inevitability
of the ICJ ruling in favor of the nationalists' claim. It came
as a great surprise to many when the court upheld South
Africa's claim to Southwest Africa. The ruling "shattered
the idea that the Court would act as an agent of transitional
justice" and emboldened the South African government.
The final two chapters of Irwin's text consider the
fallout from the ICJ decision and how it reoriented the
tactics and policies of all parties involved. Fundamental
to these chapters is Irwin's commitment to demonstrating
that the ultimate end of apartheid in the 1990s was neither
inevitable nor predictable but "ebbed and flowed in
various directions as different doors opened and closed on
international and domestic stages" (186). The ICJ ruling was
a setback for those fighting apartheid, but it forced them to
reorient their battles in way that ultimately would prove
more powerful. Keenly aware of its Cold War strategic
importance and emboldened by the court ruling, the South
African government was able to parlay its victory into
more favorable relations with the United States. Prior to
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the ruling, the U.S. government, influenced by the work of
Mennen Williams, had been hedging its bets against the
apartheid regime. Convinced that its days were numbered,
both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations sought
to assure third world leaders that the United States stood
united against racist regimes. This stance was especially
important within the context of the Cold War. With the
ICJ's decision supporting the South African government,
the United States did an about-face. As a result, "by the end
of 1968, Washington had accepted the status quo in South
Africa and was beginning to discuss ways to curtail the
influence of anti-apartheid advocates at the international
level" (128).
For African nationalists, the ICJ ruling posed different
problems. What in the early 1960s had been a belief in the
transformative powers of the UN turned into a much more
restrained assessment of the organization as a "knowledge
source" and "organizing center" (143). Far from giving up
their battles, however, anti-apartheid activists switched to
fighting the South African government. In the aftermath
of the ICJ decision, they transformed apartheid from a
'"regional [African] problem' into a flashpoint in a larger,
integrated story of neocolonial power in the world" that
was "out of step with the shared values of all the people in
the world community" (144, 146). Reframing apartheid in
these terms galvanized people around the world into what
became a global movement to end South African apartheid.
According the Irwin, the success of this new tactic
combined with the failures in the UN and ICJ to reinforce
the idea that "true inde2endence" did not come "from
decolonization but from the networks and identities that
transcended, contested, and subverted the nation-state"
(154). Irwin believes that such subverting demonstrated
"the way globalization was transforming the Cold War"
(155).
The strong points of Irwin's text are also its greatest
weaknesses. In seeking to remain true to the multifaceted
and complex situation surrounding South African
apartheid, Irwin weaves a narrative that is at times
confusing. Taken individually, his chapters present strong
arguments that are lessons in close reading and painstaking
research. Yet when woven together, these same chapters at
times feel disjointed because of the multitude of arguments
they are trying to make. For example, Irwin's analysis
of international organizations such as the UN and the
International Court of Justice is seamless and fascinating.
His ability to home in on the larger issues at stake is
impressive. However, the pairing of this conversation with
a detailed analysis of U.S. foreign policy feels mismatched;
the nuts and bolts of policymaking are presented alongside
more profound conclusions about how the ICJ decision
altered global thinking. Despite these jarring moments of
overreach, Ryan Irwin's text is a welcome addition to the
global history of the post-World War II era and is a valuable
source for use in botn undergraduate and graduate courses.
A Different Lens
Ryan M. Irwin

very sincere thank you to Kate Burlingham, Leslie
Hadfield, Eric Morgan, and Phil Muehlenbeck, as
well as James Meriwether for his introduction and
Andrew Johns for this orportunity. In the past few years, I
have had the privilege o working alongside Kate, Eric, and
Phil at different conferences, and I have admired Leslie's
work from afar. Together they are doing some of the most
important and interesting scholarship in our field, and I am
deeply appreciative of the thoroughness of their comments
ancf the ilioughtfulness of their critiques.
As each of the essays suggests, Gordian Knot is an
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unusual book. It is not quite a history of U.S. foreign
apartheid's centrality both to the Third World project
relations-African and Afrikaner nationalism organize too
and to African nationalism-subtly distort my claims.
much of the narrative-but it is not really an African history
Gordian Knot is about a microcosm, one that illuminated
either, since most of the action unfolds within international
an ongoing debate about racial paternalism's relationship
organizations. The book is designed to work on two levels; it
to material progress and the postcolonial nation-state. My
argument is not that Africans chose to care about apartheid
explores both the diplomatic contest that surrounded South
African apartheid and the intellectual story of how people
over development or Algeria or the Congo; it is that South
learned lessons about their sovereignty as they exercised
Africa's poficies sharpened opinions about the meaning
that sovereignty in novel ways after decolonization. Gordian
of development and racial difference. Muehlenbeck and
Knot tries to capture what American hegemony felt like in
I are engaged in different sorts of intellectual projects.
these years, especially to small actors with big expectations.
On the Third World, for instance, the sentence he quotes
The book admittedly revels in its own granularity at timescomes at the end of a deliberately phrased paragraph that
as Burlingham and Hadfield suggest-but this attention
doesn't argue that anti-apartheid sentiment "formed" the
Third World. Rather, it shows that apartheid influenced
to detail is balanced by a hedgehog-like interpretation of
the wider discourse of anti-racism in these years, which
international life in the 1960s.
Gordian Knot is the product of our historiographical
played a crucial role in shaping the political agenda of the
Afro-Asian bloc at the United Nations. Muehlenbeck fails
moment. When Matthew Connelly called on diplomatic
to relate the nuances of this claim, and his suggestion that
historians to take off the "Cold War lens" and explore the
twentieth century in its full
apartheid had no influence on
complexity, his words were a
the Third World is factually
Gordian Knot attempts to move the United States to
inaccurate.
useful reminder-especially
the side in a way that enhances our understanding
Muehlenbeck
raises
to graduate students searching
some good points about
of American power during the mid-twentieth
for dissertation projects-that
century. Washington was a referee in the apartheid
President
Kennedy.
Our
the East-West interpretative
debate-not an antagonist-and treating it as
quarrel may have potential
paradigm
had
certain
such facilitates a two-part investigation of how
as an organizing debate in
conceptual limitations. That
outside actors influenced U.S. policy and how U.S.
this subfield: What motivated
was thirteen years ago, and if
America's interest in African
officials responded to their efforts. This approach
you have attended a SHAFR
affairs? Muehlenbeck and I
requiresd·uxtapositions that some readers may find
conference recently you have
unortho ox, as Burlingham indicates, but it provides
agree that the U.S. government
probably had the privilege of
useful insight into the way high politics interacted
engaged African issues in
listening to panels on topics
with postcolonial claim-making.
these years, but we disagree on
ranging from migration and
borders to cultural theory
the reasons. For Muehlenbeck
and transnational activism.
this engagement stemmed
The Cold War lens is off. This
from an unwritten /olicy
turn has carried many labels and has found widespread
that was designed by Kennedy himself and flowe from
support within SHAFR, but it has also muddled the field
his egalitarian commitment to social justice and African
in fascinating and frustrating ways, and Gordian Knot is
people. I'm not convinced by his evidence. In chapter 3,
Gordian Knot uses Mennen Williams's story to explore the
designed to tacitly raise an underexplored question: What
are we talking about?
mechanics of how civil rights and liberal internationalism
The book flirts with two different sorts of answers. First,
interacted with U.S. policymaking toward South Africa.
it eschews the bilateral approach to international history.
Rather than taking the president's words at face value, the
Gordian Knot attempts to move the United States to the side
resulting narrative lingers on the tension between rhetoric
in a way that enhances our understanding of American
and politics and points the reader toward an alternative
power during the mid-twentieth century. Washington was
concfusion: the administration's African policy was tied
a referee in the apartheid debate-not an antagonist-and
to the United Nations. Kennedy lobbied African leaders
treating it as such facilitates a two-part investigation of
and adopted a symbolic stand toward apartheid because
how outside actors influenced U.S. policy and now U.S.
he hoped that mid-century international institutions
officials responded to their efforts. Tnis approach requires
could manage the tumult of African decolonization and
enhance American prestige in the postcolonial world. By
juxtapositions that some readers may find unorthodox, as
Burlingham indicates, but it provides useful insight into
using Williams's story as a device to explore Washington's
the way high politics interacted with postcolonial claimmessiness, this argument attempts to enhance what we
have already learned from Thomas Noer, Tim Borstelmann,
making.
and William Minter. The president mattered, but so too
Second, the book makes a case for studying political
did the assumptions that connected Washington to these
process. The growing tendency to theorize American
power has culminated in a vibrant historiography that has
institutions.
obscured the contingencies of international life in the midMuehlenbeck also challenges the book's central claim.
twentieth century. Focusing on what I call identification
In his mind, the Sino-Soviet split, globalization, and
American economic stagnation, among other variables,
politics is one way to explain the development and
foreclosure of different political trajectories in the recent
played a more prominent role than decolonization in
eroding Washington's influence over and support for the
past, and it sheds light on how tropes of empire operated
within particular contact zones. Gordian Knot, in other
United Nations order. There is a terrific group of young
words, invites a conversation about the way American
historians working on this question, including Paul
power worked. It is not a call to study apartheid or global
Chamberlin, Chris Dietrich, Jeremy Friedman, Victor
race relations so much as a subtle rejection of the field's
McFarland, Chris Miller, Mike Morgan, Daniel Sargent,
and Sarah Snyder, and it would be exciting if this shift
obsession with American power's name.
in the Washington-UN relationship gained traction in
Burlingham, Hadfield, Morgan, and Muehlenbeck
the historiography, since the United Nations' importance
critique this approach in different and very smart ways. Phil
is often downplayed in narratives about the Cold War.
Muehlenbeck expresses the most skepticism about Gordian
Knot's conclusions. As his footnotes attest, he has a dog in this
I stand by my interpretation. Notions of nationhood and
fight and some of these comments are as relevant to his book
order changed as people interacted within international
arenas, and the book's central irony-that this conflict
as mine. His first two criticisms-that I have exaggerated
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moved in tandem with Washington's fleeting embrace of
interactive institutions such as the United Nations and the
International Court-is a useful way to think about how
and why the system became unmanageable when it did.
The anti-apartheid story facilitates a detailed examination
of decolonization's relationship to global governance and
illuminates some of the stakes that surrounded the turn
toward detente. There may be better ways to conceptualize
this period-and I eagerly await the evolution of this
historiography-but my argument isn't necessarily wrong
just because it's new.
Gordian Knot is about the unmaking of a political
system, the origin and afterlife of which are beyond the
book's temforai frame. The book looks the way it does for
a reason, o course, but Eric Morgan is right to critique this
underlying tension. He raises two interesting questions:
Was there a lost moment in the 1960s, and did citizen
activists buttress liberal internationalism? On both fronts,
my tentative answer is no. Gordian Knot certainly invites
the reader to see the ICJ case through African nationalist
eyes, and it suggests that American policy thinking wasn't
preordained in the mid-1960s, but I prefer to see this
moment's implications in grayer terms.
My hope is that readers will pay as much attention to the
midpoint of the ICJ case, when the African Group's lawyers
turned to the norm of nondiscrimination, as its controversial
resolution. Although American liberals certainly remained
internationally minded after the 1960s, a fascinating shift
occurred as development and decolonization collided in
these years and older assumptions about state capacity and
universal modernity eroded in the face of racial equality,
human rights, and non-national identity. I prefer to see
the ICJ as a window into this process rather than a lost
moment, which tacitly answers Morgan's question about
citizen activism. His version of liberal internationalismfocused on collaboration among citizen activists and
advocacy against a common enemy-has merit, but it
would arguably obscure this transition and distort the
nation-state's conceptual centrality to the mid-twentieth
century. Although liberals remained internationalist after
1970, the assumptions that oriented the liberal order had
fallen by the wayside.
That is a topic worthy of a long debate. Less debatable
is Leslie Hadfield's observation that African diplomats
should have had a greater presence in Gordian Knot. One
of the book's main research challenges was gaining access
to African diplomatic materials. I used private papers
and South Africa's liberation archive, as well as United
Nations materials, but I was unable to secure access to
diplomatic cables from African governments, which was
a disappointment. The resulting portrait is as complex
and tnorough as my sources allowed. Hadfield's lament
regarding unnamed Africans is misguided, in my opinion,
since Americans and South Africans are also left unnamed
at different junctures, always for stylistic reasons related
to narrative flow. But I accept the overall thrust of her
critigue. One issue that continues to absorb me is the
medi.anics of how African diplomats communicated with
their home governments. From what I can tell, African
diplomats enjoyed a unique sort of autonomy in New York,
which hints at the somewhat ironic nature of postcolonial
sovereignty after 1960. For small national states, the General
Assembly became essential to the meaning (and location)
of "independence."
On the ANC, Hadfield's comments are useful. Although
she skims over my actual interpretation, calling it incisive
without explainins; its place in this literature, sne is correct
that Gordian Knot s final chapter might have done more
with events in black South Africa during the late 1960s.
The ANC's archives don't indicate that the exile mission
operated in the way she suggests-especially after the
Rivonia Trials-but every book would benefit from more
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attention to local nuance.
Again, a very sincere thankJou to Kate Burlingham,
Leslie Hadfield, Eric Morgan, an Phil Muehlenbeck. I am
honored by their willingness to review the book and deeply
appreciative of their thoughtful and incisive critiques. My
hope has always been that Gordian Knot might contribute to
the ongoing conversation about the contours, content, and
direction of U.S. foreign relations history.
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